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 ABSTRACT 
In 2002, the Chinese government renewed commitment to rural health.  One 
experimental insurance program, Rural Mutual Health Care (RMHC), provides 
affordable coverage for rural residents where a previous insurance system, Cooperative 
Medical System (CMS), was poorly functioning.  This study examined how RMHC 
affected physician prescribing in Fengshan Township, Guizhou Province, China.  Six 
village doctors were chosen for study based on prior reviews showing high, average, or 
low rates of prescribing errors.  858 prescriptions with the single diagnosis of common 
cold were systematic sampled from insured and uninsured patient visits in March-May 
2003 (under CMS) and 2004 (under RMHC).  Peer physicians reviewed prescriptions for 
inappropriate prescribing.  X2, Fisher’s exact, and two-tailed t-tests were used to explore 
demographic and prescription characteristics.  Multiple linear and logistic regressions 
were used to model outcomes of: number of medications, cost, injection use, and 
inappropriate prescribing with covariates of: patient age and gender, prescribing doctor, 
year, insurance, and year-insurance interaction.  Results show mean cost decreased from 
13.09 yuan in 2003 to 7.22 yuan in 2004 (p<0.001).  Cost increased from 7.12 yuan for 
the uninsured to 11.19 yuan for the insured (p<0.001).  After adjusting for other 
covariates, RMHC had lower drug costs and fewer medications as compared to CMS 
(respectively, p=0.025 and p=0.001), but RMHC had no significant effect on injection 
use or inappropriate prescribing (respectively, p=0.641 and p=0.912).  In conclusion, this 
study shows RMHC successfully controls medication costs, but likely has little effect on 
quality of care.  A larger, more rigorous study is needed to assess RMHC’s impact on 
quality of care. 
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INTRODUCTION  
China’s economic development since 1978 open policy reforms has led to 
incredible progress and financial success, however, a large disparity now exists between 
the rich and poor, especially with regards to health.  800 million out of the total 1.3 
billion Chinese currently live in rural areas, but 80% of medical resources are 
concentrated in urban areas.1  Fewer than 10% of rural residents have health insurance 
while roughly half the urban population has employment-based health insurance.2  
Moreover, health outcomes are worse in rural areas: in recent years, infant mortality rates 
have increased in some poor rural areas while rates in urban areas continue to decline.2  
Realizing this enormous rural health care problem, the Chinese government is now 
actively supporting various health care reforms throughout the country.   
Historically, the communist government has had two approaches to health care.  
In the 1950s, China created rural Cooperative Medical Systems (CMS) to provide basic 
preventive and public health services to rural areas.  CMS used community-based health 
insurance and minimally trained “barefoot doctors” to accomplish incredible 
improvements in health.  From 1952 to 1985, life expectancy in rural China nearly 
doubled, increasing from 35 to 68 years.3  By comparison, life expectancy in the United 
States during this time increased just 6 years, from 69 to 75 years.4  In the 1970s, rural 
health care coverage reached 90% or higher.5  However, when China introduced 
widespread economic reforms in the 1980s, the agriculture sector became decentralized 
and privatized.  CMS was based on agricultural communes, and, with dismantling of this 
financial structure, the health care sector also became privatized and decentralized.  CMS 
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rapidly declined, and rural health care coverage dropped from 90% in the 1970s to 4.8% 
in 1984.5  Rural providers essentially became private practitioners, with strong financial 
incentives governing their actions.  For patients, the decline of CMS led to growing rural-
urban inequities in health care financing, access, quality, and ultimately outcomes. 
In the past 20 years, total health expenditure in China has risen 40-fold, and in 
2005, a total of US$91.8 billion or 5.5% of GDP was spent on health care.1  Total health 
spending on average increases 15-22% per year while GDP increases 9% a year.6  Of 
total health expenditures, out-of-pocket expenditures increased from 20% in 1980 to 54% 
in 2005.6  In fact, the percentage of total health expenditure contributed by the 
government decreased from 36% in 1980 to 17% in 2004, creating an enormous financial 
burden on private payers.1  The relationship between health and ability to pay is well-
documented.  Average rural incomes in China are much less than urban incomes.2  Per 
capita GDP for Beijing province was 25,523 yuan (US $3190) in 2001, nearly 10 times as 
much as that of Guizhou province, a poor rural province, at only 2,895 yuan (US $361).7  
A 1998 National Health Services Survey found that 10% of the rural Chinese population 
lived below the poverty line.8  Of those in poverty, 30-50% become impoverished as a 
result of illness, with costs for one hospitalization exceeding the annual income for 
roughly half the rural population.9,10  Disparities between rich and poor even in rural 
areas is also quite striking.  While the rich tend to spend more absolute money on health 
care, the relative costs of health care are much higher for the poor.  One study estimated 
that in 2003, one hospitalization equaled 42 months per capita income for the poorest 
quintile of rural residents as opposed to 9 months per capita income for the richest 
quintile.11    
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This financial strain is in fact a huge access barrier.  Self-medication is a preferred, 
cheaper mechanism of health care for the rural poor, and many patients also refuse 
hospitalization even with referrals due to costs.  One study found that among patients in 
the poorest quintile refusing hospitalization, close to 80% listed lack of finances as the 
main reason for non-admission.11  Furthermore, even if rural residents are able to afford 
health care, many are unable to access high-quality care.  A 1995 study found that 30% of 
villages in poor rural areas had no village doctor.12  Another study estimated that one-
third of drugs sold in rural areas are counterfeit.13  Poor quality health care coupled with 
lack of financial resources to access care only leads to worse health outcomes for rural 
residents as compared to urban residents.  Under-five mortality in 2002 was 39 per 1000 
in rural areas versus 14 per 1000 in urban areas.2  Maternal mortality in 2002 was 72 per 
100,000 in rural areas and 54 per 100,000 in urban areas.2  These urban-rural differences 
are quite striking when one considers the public health mission of CMS and the barefoot 
doctors just 20 years ago.   
In response to these problems in rural health care, the Chinese government began 
to reevaluate CMS and community-based health insurance programs in the 1990s.  In 
2002, the China National Rural Health Conference developed policies to increase 
financial support to rural health facilities and expand CMS.8  The New Rural Cooperative 
Medical Schemes (NCMS) aim to create a basic financial safety net for rural areas using 
voluntary community-based health insurance.2  Under this program, central government, 
local provincial governments, and individual families each pay 10 yuan (US $1.25) per 
person for insurance premiums, with additional government subsidies for the poorest 
people.13  Local governments have considerable financial and regulatory autonomy over 
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the specifics of NCMS programs.  There are currently over 300 pilot NCMS plans 
throughout China.  Most plans, however, offer mainly catastrophic health insurance, with 
high deductibles, high co-payments, and coverage limited to inpatient care.14   
Potential problems in the current NCMS, according to a 2004 World Health 
Organization (WHO) report, include lack of a “common, rigorous standardized 
framework” for evaluating NCMS programs, adverse selection, overemphasis on 
catastrophic illness, and lack of preventive health promotion.15  In general, community-
based health insurance programs (CBHI) have been shown to impact finances but perhaps 
not quality of care.  A systematic review of CBHI literature found some strong evidence 
that CBHI provided financial protection for patients, but weak or no evidence that CBHI 
improved quality or efficiency of health care.16  Similarly, one study in China found that 
insurance status had significant associations with medications, costs, and quality of care.  
Insured patients received fewer numbers of prescribed medications, but were prescribed 
more expensive medications and thus spent more total money on medications per visit.17  
Whether these expensive medications were more or less appropriate treatments was 
undeterminable. 
Overuse of certain medications is both consumer and provider-driven.  Self-
medication, patient demand for antibiotics, non-adherence, and cultural preferences for 
injections all contribute to consumer demand for medications in many developing 
countries.18  Providers, in turn, have strong financial incentives for over-prescribing.  In 
Asia, out-of-pocket spending makes up roughly 75% of drug expenditures, with most of 
this money going to private providers.19  Many countries have separated medical services 
from pharmaceutical sales to lower financial incentives for inappropriate prescribing, but 
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doctors in rural China still both prescribe and sell drugs.20  A 1999 study in rural China 
found significant associations between health insurance and prescriptions of antibiotics: 
uninsured patients received more antibiotics and injections, but physicians prescribed 
newer, more expensive antibiotics for insured patients.21  In another study, providers 
actually admitted to prescribing more expensive antibiotics to patients with health 
insurance and to those who could afford to pay.22  In fact, 55% of inpatient and 70% of 
outpatient revenues in rural Chinese health facilities come from drug sales, as compared 
to 50% in urban facilities.21  Moreover, markups for prescription drugs can be as high as 
40-80% per a WHO report on rural China.23   
Inappropriate prescribing not only increases costs for patients, but also has grave 
public health consequences such as adverse drug events and antibiotic resistance.18  
Adverse drug events cause an estimated 10,000 deaths annually in the UK, and 
medication errors cause an estimated 7,000 deaths every year in the US.24, 25  Studies in 
Hong Kong, Bangkok, and South Korea have found that antibiotics are prescribed for as 
much as 60-89% of outpatient visits for cold and flu symptoms.26, 27  A 2000 study in 
rural China showed that 61% of medications prescribed for influenza were unnecessary.28  
Furthermore, rates of antibiotic resistance are higher in Asia than in other parts of the 
world.29  Prevalence of penicillin-resistant Streptococcus pneumoniae is as high as 75% 
in South Korea as compared to 43% in France and a low 7% in Germany.30,31  
Erythromycin-resistant S. pneumoniae prevalence is also quite high in Asia: 92.1% in 
Vietnam, 80.6% in Korea, and 73.9% in China.32  Thus, inappropriate prescribing by 
physicians has potential negative impacts on both health care costs and outcomes.   
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Most of the NCMS pilot programs are catastrophic insurance schemes focusing 
very little on changing actual health care costs or physician prescribing behavior.  One 
unique pilot NCMS program is Rural Mutual Health Care (RMHC), a rural healthcare 
insurance experiment led by Harvard and Yale faculty researchers in collaboration with 
the Chinese government.  RMHC is voluntary, subsidized, and locally-managed 
community-based health insurance, with a strong focus on prevention and primary 
care.2,13  RMHC research funds pay 20 yuan per person (the equivalent of the NCMS 
government share) while enrollees contribute 10 yuan per person, with exemptions for 
the poor.  Local township RMHC offices have board members chosen from the 
community, and these offices control finances, benefits packages, hiring of selected 
village doctors, and contracts with local hospitals.  RMHC has several cost-control 
mechanisms to increase financial protection for members and to decrease financial 
incentives for inappropriate prescribing.  Payment to outpatient providers consists of 
fixed salaries, fee-for-visit reimbursements, and bonuses at the end of the year with any 
remaining funds.  In addition, providers are required to buy drugs from RMHC, follow an 
essential drug list, and sell drugs at cost to patients.  Local RMHC offices periodically 
evaluate village doctors to ensure proper reimbursements and quality care.   
To date, studies on RMHC have looked at baseline poverty and ill health, adverse 
selection, and unequal distribution of benefits, but none have addressed RMHC’s impact 
on cost to patients or health outcomes.33, 34, 35   
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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND HYPOTHESES 
This pilot study aims to examine how RMHC affects physician prescribing 
practices both in terms of costs to patients and quality of care.  Health outcomes like 
mortality or morbidity require long observation times, thus inappropriate prescribing 
could be a possible proxy for quality of care.  This research study tests the feasibility of 
using inappropriate prescribing for common colds to measure RMHC’s impact on quality 
of care. 
There are two sets of hypotheses.  First, RMHC reduced medication costs for 
members as compared to uninsured RMHC patients and compared to the old CMS 
insurance.  Second, RMHC reduced inappropriate prescribing for members as compared 
to uninsured RMHC patients and compared to the old CMS insurance. 
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METHODS  
Background  
Details of RMHC are described in these referenced previous studies.13, 33, 34, 35  In 
brief, two of the poorest provinces in China, Guizhou and Shanxi Provinces, were chosen 
as sites for a voluntary community-based health insurance program, Rural Mutual Health 
Care.  In 2002, RMHC was implemented by a Harvard-Yale research team in conjunction 
with the local Kaiyang County Public Health Office in Fengshan Township, part of 
Kaiyang County in Guizhou Province.  RMHC used research funds to simulate the 
government contribution for rural insurance, 20 yuan per capita, and any additional 
government subsidies for the poorest residents.  Enrollees, in turn, contributed 10 yuan.  
Benefits packages included different levels of co-payments for prescription medications 
and outpatient visits to the local village doctor as well as reduced rates for inpatient 
hospitalizations.  Several cost-control mechanisms were built into RMHC, as detailed in 
prior sections. 
This study focused specifically on the RMHC site of Fengshan Township.  
Fengshan is comprised of 26 villages that are served by one township hospital and 56 
village doctors.  Not all village doctors are hired by RMHC.  In 2001, Fengshan had a 
population of 37,000 and annual income per capita of 2000 yuan (US $275).  In 2003, 
Fengshan’s RMHC enrollment was close to 70%, and 11% of the poorest residents were 
fully subsidized by RMHC.13, 35 
Prior RMHC evaluation of village doctors in January-February 2004 showed rates 
of inappropriate prescribing ranging from as low as 1% to as high as 59%.  Criteria for 
inappropriate prescribing used for this evaluation included incorrect medication usage as 
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well as inaccurate billing.  This pilot study had limited resources and time to evaluate all 
RMHC doctors.  Instead, six doctors were chosen based on the prior evaluation as a 
representative sample of village doctors hired by RMHC.  Two doctors had low rates of 
inappropriate prescriptions, one doctor from Sanhe village at 5% and one from Yongxing 
village at 4%.  Two doctors had average rates of inappropriate prescriptions, one 
Duoyang village doctor and one Anping village doctor both at 14%.  Two doctors had 
high rates of inappropriate prescriptions, one Guaizhai village doctor and one Xinhua 
doctor both at 59%.   
 
Sampling of prescriptions  
Data collection occurred during July-August 2004.  The above-selected doctors in 
6 villages – Anping village, Duoyang village, Guaizhai village, Sanhe village, Xinhua 
village, and Yongxing village – were asked to submit all clinic prescription records for 
two different time periods.  Prescriptions were selected from: March-May 2003 before 
implementation of RMHC in these villages, and March-May 2004 after RMHC 
implementation.  Choosing the same time period of March-May for each year was 
intended to reduce confounding from seasonal variability of disease.  Within each time 
period, prescriptions were collected for uninsured and insured patients (under CMS and 
RMHC for respective time periods).  RMHC and the prior CMS insurance programs both 
required doctors to keep carbon copies of prescriptions for reimbursement.  Some, but not 
all, doctors also kept records of uninsured patient visits.   
Out of all the prescriptions collected, only those with the single diagnosis of “gan 
mao” or “common cold” were selected for this study.  Prescription records with multiple 
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diagnoses were also excluded from this study.  The common cold was the chosen 
diagnosis for this study because it is the most common diagnosis given to patients by 
village doctors, representing over half of all clinic visits, and because all doctors should 
be trained to adequately treat the common cold.  The original goal was to systematically 
sample 30-60 common cold prescriptions per physician per insurance group.  If the total 
number of available prescriptions exceeded 60, then one out of every x (x being the total 
divided by 60) prescriptions were selected.  Ultimately, a total of 858 prescriptions with 
the single diagnosis of “common cold” were sampled for this study.   
Each prescription sheet actually functioned more like a clinic visit note because it 
listed patient diagnosis, symptoms, all medications and dosages, and cost for that visit.  
The following data were recorded per prescription sheet: prescribing doctor, visit date, 
patient’s age, patient’s gender, patient’s insurance status, diagnosis, symptoms (if 
available), each drug prescribed, total number of drugs prescribed, use of any injections, 
and total price of all drugs. 
Main outcome measures used for this pilot study were: total number of 
medications per prescription/visit, total cost of prescription, use of injections, and 
inappropriate prescribing for common cold, based on peer physician review.   Number of 
medications and total cost are objective, quantitative measures of physician prescribing 
behavior, while injection use and inappropriate prescribing are subjective surrogates for 
assessing quality of care. 
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Peer review of prescriptions for inappropriateness 
Each prescription was reviewed by one of two Kaiyang County Health 
Department physicians.  The reviewers gave each prescription a binary score of 
appropriate or inappropriate medication usage based on all the information recorded on 
the prescription sheet: patient diagnosis, symptoms, and age.  Criteria for labeling a 
prescription “inappropriate” were: incorrect use of a prescribed drug, incorrect dose, 
incorrect drug delivery (oral versus injection/intravenous), drug-drug interactions, and 
redundant use of drugs.  This pilot study, unlike the prior RMHC physician evaluation, 
did not use incorrect billing or overpricing of medications as criteria for 
inappropriateness of prescriptions. 
There were several limitations to the objectiveness of the peer reviewing process 
which this pilot study was unable to address due to funding and time constraints.  No 
prescriptions were reviewed by both physicians to check for inter-observer reliability.  In 
addition, the two health department physicians were also involved in overall RMHC 
management.  They thus had prior knowledge and possible biases towards the selected 
village doctors.  It was not possible to blind the two reviewing physicians to prescribing 
doctor or patient insurance status because that information was written on the 
prescriptions.  Peer reviewers were also not blinded to this study’s objectives because 
soliciting their help required explaining study aims.  Similarly, village doctors were told 
of study aims when prescriptions were collected from their offices.   
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Statistical Analysis 
 Prescription data was entered into Microsoft Excel (Microsoft Corp, Seattle, WA) 
and converted to Intercooled Stata version 9.0 (Stata Corp, College Station, TX) for all 
subsequent analyses.  Age was first analyzed as a continuous variable and then stratified 
into 3 categories: age ≤ 15, age 16-45, and age > 46.  Cost was transformed to logcost.  
Background characteristics between groups were analyzed using X2 tests for difference in 
proportions and Fisher’s exact test for categorical variables.  Two-tailed t-tests with 
unequal groups were used for continuous variables.  Comparisons were made between 
2003 (under CMS insurance, before RMHC implementation) and 2004 (after RMHC 
implementation); between insured and uninsured patient prescriptions regardless of 
insurance program; between CMS insured and RMHC insured patient prescriptions; and 
between uninsured 2003 (not enrolled in CMS) and uninsured 2004 (not enrolled in 
RMHC) patient prescriptions.   
Four multiple regression models were used.  First, multiple linear regression was 
performed on the number of medications as a function of patient age, patient gender, 
village doctor, use of any injections, year, insurance, and the interaction of 
year*insurance.  Second, multiple linear regression was also performed on logcost using 
the same covariates as above.  Third, multiple logistic regression was performed on use 
of any injections using covariates of age, gender, village doctor, number of medications, 
year, insurance, and year*insurance.  Fourth, multiple logistic regression was performed 
on the binary outcome of prescription appropriateness or inappropriateness using the 
same covariates used with multiple linear regression.  Regarding village doctors, the 
tables show regressions with Anping village as the reference village. 
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RESULTS  
General Information 
A total of 858 prescriptions with single diagnosis of common cold were collected.  
414 prescriptions were from 2003 pre-RMHC implementation and, of these, 272 were for 
insured CMS and 142 for uninsured patients.  444 prescriptions were from 2004 post-
RMHC implementation and, of these, 301 were for insured RMHC and 143 for uninsured 
patients.  Table 1 lists numbers of prescriptions collected by village doctor and insurance 
category.  The number of prescriptions collected per category ranges from 0 to 59.   
 
Table 1: Overall Prescription and Demographic Characteristics 
 Number of prescriptions collected  
 
Villages 
 
Year 2003 (under CMS) 
 
Year 2004 (under RMHC) 
 
Total 
 Uninsured Insured  Uninsured  Insured   
Anping 0 55 42 56 153 
Duoyang 29 51 19 52 151 
Guaizhai 49 52 34 59 194 
Sanhe 36 52 45 49 182 
Xinhua 0 28 3 37 68 
Yongxing 28 34 0 48 110 
Total 142 272 143 301 858 
 
Patients 
     
Age         Mean 33.72 years, Range 0-86 years  
      Age ≤ 15    
      Age 16-45    
      Age > 46 
273 (31.8%) 
262 (30.5%) 
323 (37.7%)    
            
Gender      
Male 451 (52.6%)    
Female 407 (47.4%)    
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Table 1: Overall Prescription and Demographic Characteristics (cont) 
Prescriptions       
Total number of 
drugs per visit 
        Mean 5.79, Range 1-18  
      
Cost          Mean 9.94 yuan, Range 0.36-52.74 yuan  
      
Injections      
None 213 (24.8%)    
>1 injection 645 (75.2%)    
 
Appropriateness 
     
Appropriate 625 (72.8%)    
Inappropriate 233 (27.2%)    
 
 Table 1 also lists the overall demographic characteristics for this data set.  Patient 
age ranged from 0 to 86 years, with a mean age of 33.72.  Shapiro-Wilk normality test for 
age showed a non-normal distribution (z=8.549, p<0.001). Closer examination of age 
revealed a tri-modal distribution, with peaked at roughly 5, 35, and 55 years.  Three age 
categories were created for subsequent data analysis – age ≤ 15, age 16-45, and age > 46.  
These age categories roughly correlate to school-age, young adults/middle-age, and older 
patients.  In this data set, 31.8% of patients were age ≤ 15; 30.5% were age 16-45; and 
37.7% were age > 46.  Shapiro-Wilk tests showed normal distributions within these 
categories: age ≤ 15 (z=0.756, p=0.225), age 16-45 (z=1.081, p=0.140), age > 46  
(z= -0.921, p=0.821).     
Regarding other variables, 52.6% of all prescriptions were for male patients.  
Total number of medications per prescription ranged from 1 to 18, with a mean of 5.79.  
Total cost per prescription ranged from 0.36 (US $0.05) to 52.74 yuan (US $6.59), with a 
mean cost of 9.94 yuan (US $1.24).  Cost was the only variable with missing values; 31 
prescriptions had no cost listed.  All 31 of these prescriptions were for uninsured CMS 
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patients: 29 of the prescriptions were from Duoyang village, and 2 from Guaizhai village.  
Use of injections was quite high: 75.2% of all prescriptions had at least one injection or 
intravenous medication.  In terms of prescribing inappropriateness, 27.2% of all 
prescriptions had at least one inappropriately prescribed medication.   
 
Comparison of 2003 versus 2004 prescriptions 
 Table 2 compares 2003 (pre-RMHC implementation) with 2004 (post-RMHC 
implementation) data.  As expected by results in Table 1, there is a statistically significant 
difference between the number of prescriptions collected per village doctor (X2=16.019, 
p=0.007).  There is also a significant difference in mean age between the two years: 30.05 
years in 2003 versus 37.13 years in 2004 (t=-4.574, p<0.001).  Significantly more older 
patients were seen in 2004 than in 2003: 43.2% prescriptions were for age > 46 in 2004 
versus 31.6% in 2003; 32.7% were for age 16-45 in 2004 versus 28.3% in 2003; and 
24.1% were for age ≤ 15 in 2004 versus 40.1% in 2003 (X2=26.247, p<0.001). 
As for other variables in Table 2, no significant difference existed for gender 
distribution between 2003 and 2004 data (X2=0.106, p=0.744).  Mean number of 
medications per prescription was slightly higher in 2003, but this difference was not 
statistically significant (t=1.708, p=0.088).  Mean cost of prescriptions significantly 
decreased from 13.09 yuan in 2003 (US $1.64) to 7.22 yuan in 2004 (US $ 0.90) (t=8.217, 
p<0.001).  Use of injections significantly decreased from 87.9% in 2003 to 63.3% in 
2004 (X2=69.665, p<0.001).  There was actually no significant difference in proportion 
of inappropriate prescriptions between the two years (X2=0.975, p=0.324).   
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Table 2: Demographic and Prescription Characteristics by Year 
 2003 Pre-
RMHC 
2004 Post-
RMHC 
Total X2 or  
T-test 
P-value 
Villages      
Anping 55 (13.3%) 98 (22.1%) 153 (17.8%) X2:  0.007 
Duoyang 80 (19.3%) 71 (16.0%) 151 (17.6%) 16.019  
Guaizhai 101 (24.4%) 93 (20.9%) 194 (22.6%)   
Sanhe 88 (21.3%) 94 (21.2%) 182 (21.2%)   
Xinhua 28 (6.8%) 40 (9.0%) 68 (7.9%)   
Yongxing 62 (15.0%) 48 (10.8%) 110 (12.8%)   
      
Patients       
Mean Age in 
years (95% CI)  
30.05 
(27.86, 32.25) 
37.13 
(35.02, 39.25) 
33.72 
(32.18, 35.25) 
T: -4.574 <0.001 
      
      Age ≤ 15 166 (40.1%) 107 (24.1%) 273 (31.8%) X2:  <0.001 
      Age 16-45 117 (28.3%) 145 (32.7%) 262 (30.5%) 26.247  
      Age > 46 131 (31.6%) 192 (43.2%) 323 (37.7%)   
 
Gender 
     
Male 220 (53.1%) 231 (52.0%) 451 (52.6%) X2: 0.106 0.744 
Female 194 (46.9%) 213 (48.0%) 407 (47.4%)   
 
Prescriptions  
     
Mean number of 
drugs (95% CI) 
5.93     
(5.73, 6.14) 
5.65     
(5.39, 5.90) 
5.79     
(5.62, 5.95) 
T: 1.708 0.088 
      
Mean cost in yuan 
(95% CI) 
13.09    
(11.85, 14.32) 
7.22 
(6.55, 7.89) 
9.94     
(9.24, 10.64) 
T: 8.217 <0.001 
      
Injections      
None 50 (12.1%) 163 (36.7%) 213 (24.8%) X2:  <0.001 
>1 injection 364 (87.9%) 281 (63.3%) 645 (75.2%) 69.665  
 
Appropriateness 
     
Appropriate 308 (74.4%) 317 (71.4%) 625 (72.8%) X2: 0.975 0.324 
Inappropriate 106 (25.6%) 127 (28.6%) 233 (27.2%)   
Total number of 
prescriptions 
414 444 858   
 
Comparison of insured (both RMHC and CMS) versus uninsured patients  
 Table 3 combines data from both 2003 and 2004, CMS and RMHC, to compare 
all uninsured (285 prescriptions) versus insured (573 prescriptions).  Patient age and 
gender, village doctor, use of injections, and prescription cost were all statistically 
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significantly different between insured and uninsured prescriptions.  Significant 
differences existed between the percentage of insured versus uninsured prescriptions 
collected per village doctor (X2=49.313, p<0.001).  Mean age for the insured was 37.67 
years, much older than the uninsured at 25.76 years (t=-7.553, p<0.001).  For age > 46, 
46.6% were insured versus 19.7% uninsured; for age 16-45, 27.9% were insured versus 
35.8% uninsured; and for age ≤ 15, 25.5% were insured versus 44.6% uninsured 
(X2=62.352, p<0.001).  Gender was also significantly different; for the insured, 51.0% 
were for female patients and 49.0% for male patients, whereas for uninsured prescriptions, 
only 40.3% were for female patients and 59.7% for male patients (X2=8.591, p=0.003).   
The average number of medications per prescription did not statistically differ 
between insured and uninsured groups (t=-1.597, p=0.111).  Mean cost for uninsured 
patients was 7.12 yuan (US $0.89), significantly lower than the mean cost of 11.19 yuan 
(US $1.40) for insured patients (t=-5.910, p<0.001).  As for injections, 84.9% of 
uninsured patients received injections as compared to 70.3% of insured patients 
(X2=21.682, p<0.001).  The proportion of inappropriate prescriptions did not 
significantly differ between insured and uninsured patients (X2=1.159, p=0.282).   
 
Table 3: Demographic and Prescription Characteristics by Insurance Status  
 Uninsured Insured Total (%) X2 or  
T-test 
P-value 
Villages      
Anping 42 (14.7%) 111 (19.4%) 153 (17.8%) X2:  <0.001 
Duoyang 48 (16.8%) 103 (18.0%) 151 (17.6%) 49.313  
Guaizhai 83 (29.1%) 111 (19.4%) 194 (22.6%)   
Sanhe 81 (28.4%) 101 (17.6%) 182 (21.2%)   
Xinhua 3 (1.1%) 65 (11.3%) 68 (7.9%)   
Yongxing 28 (9.8%) 82 (14.3%) 110 (12.8%)   
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Table 3: Demographic and Prescription Characteristics by Insurance Status (cont) 
 Uninsured Insured Total (%) X2 or T P-value 
Patients      
Mean Age in 
years (95% CI) 
25.76 
(23.29, 28.24) 
37.67 
(35.81, 39.54) 
33.72 
(32.18, 35.25) 
T: -7.553 <0.001 
      
      Age ≤ 15 127 (44.6%) 146 (25.5%) 273 (31.8%) X2:  <0.001 
      Age 16-45 102 (35.8%) 160 (27.9%) 262 (30.5%) 62.352  
      Age > 46 56   (19.7%) 267 (46.6%) 323 (37.7%)   
 
Gender 
     
Male 170 (59.7%) 281 (49.0%) 451 (52.6%) X2: 8.591 0.003 
Female 115 (40.3%) 292 (51.0%) 407 (47.4%)   
      
Prescriptions      
Mean number of 
drugs (95% CI) 
5.60    
(5.33, 5.87) 
5.88     
(5.67, 6.09) 
5.79     
(5.62, 5.95) 
T: -1.597 0.111 
      
Mean cost in yuan 
(95% CI) 
7.12 
(6.09, 8.14) 
11.19 
(10.30, 12.08) 
9.94     
(9.24, 10.64) 
T: -5.910 <0.001 
      
Injections      
None 43 (15.1%) 170 (29.7%) 213 (24.8%) X2:  <0.001 
>1 injection 242 (84.9%) 403 (70.3%) 645 (75.2%) 21.682  
 
Appropriateness 
     
Appropriate 201 (70.5%) 424 (74.0%) 625 (72.8%) X2: 1.159 0.282 
Inappropriate 84 (29.5%) 149 (26.0%) 233 (27.2%)   
Total number of 
prescriptions 
285 573 858   
 
Comparison of CMS insured versus RMHC insured prescriptions 
 Of the 858 prescriptions collected, 272 were for CMS insured (2003, pre-RMHC 
implementation) patients and 301 for RMHC (2004) patients.  Table 4 shows that age, 
use of injections, mean number of medications per prescription, and mean cost were 
significantly differ between the two insurance groups.  There was no significant 
difference between the numbers of CMS versus RMHC insured prescriptions collected by 
village doctor (X2=2.725, p=0.742).  Mean age of RMHC insured prescriptions was 
significantly higher, 41.25 years, than for CMS insured prescriptions, 33.71 years  
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(t=-4.025, p<0.001).  54.1% of RMHC prescriptions were for patients age > 46 versus 
38.2% of CMS; 25.3% of RMHC were for age 16-45 versus 30.9% of CMS; and 20.6% 
of RMHC were for age ≤ 15 versus 30.9% of CMS (X2=15.324, p<0.001).  There was no 
significant difference in gender distribution for RMHC versus CMS insured prescriptions 
(X2=1.143, p=0.285). 
 In terms of prescription characteristics, significantly fewer drugs were used for 
RMHC than CMS insured patients, mean of 5.54 versus 6.25 medicines per prescription 
(t=3.392, p<0.001).  Also, RMHC prescriptions had significantly lower costs than CMS 
prescriptions, 7.95 yuan versus 14.78 yuan (t=7.761, p<0.001).  Use of injections also 
significantly decreased under RMHC as opposed to CMS, 56.5% of RMHC versus 85.7% 
of CMS (X2=58.319, p<0.001).  However, proportion of inappropriate prescriptions did 
not significantly differ between the two insurance categories; overall, 26.0% of insured 
prescriptions had one inappropriately prescribed medication (X2=0.271, p=0.603). 
 
Table 4: Demographic and Prescription Characteristics comparing CMS insured 
versus RMHC insured 
 CMS insured RMHC 
insured 
Total (%) X2 or  
T-test 
P-value 
Villages      
Anping 55 (20.2%) 56 (18.6%) 111 (19.4%) X2: 2.725 0.742 
Duoyang 51 (18.7%) 52 (17.3%) 103 (18.0%)   
Guaizhai 52 (19.1%) 59 (19.6%) 111 (19.4%)   
Sanhe 52 (19.1%) 49 (16.3%) 101 (17.6%)   
Xinhua 28 (10.3%) 37 (12.3%) 65 (11.3%)   
Yongxing 34 (12.5%) 48 (15.9%) 82 (14.3%)   
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Table 4: Demographic and Prescription Characteristics comparing CMS insured 
versus RMHC insured (cont) 
 CMS insured RMHC 
insured 
Total (%) X2 or T P-value 
Patients      
Mean Age in 
years (95% CI) 
33.71 
(31.07, 36.36) 
41.25 
(38.68, 43.82) 
37.67 
(35.81, 39.54) 
T: -4.025 <0.001 
      
      Age ≤ 15 84   (30.9%) 62   (20.6%) 146 (25.5%) X2:  <0.001 
      Age 16-45 84   (30.9%) 76   (25.3%) 160 (27.9%) 15.324  
      Age > 46 104 (38.2%) 163 (54.1%) 267 (46.6%)   
 
Gender 
     
Male 127 (46.7%) 154 (51.2%) 281 (49.0%) X2: 1.143 0.285 
Female 145 (53.3%) 147 (48.8%) 292 (51.0%)   
      
Prescriptions      
Mean number of 
drugs (95% CI) 
6.25 
(6.00, 6.51) 
5.54 
(5.21, 5.87) 
5.88 
(5.67, 6.09) 
T: 3.392 <0.001 
      
Mean cost in yuan 
(95% CI) 
14.78 
(13.29, 16.27) 
7.95 
(7.07, 8.83) 
11.19 
(10.30, 12.08) 
T: 7.761 <0.001 
      
Injections      
None 39 (14.3%) 131 (43.5%) 170 (29.7%) X2:  <0.001 
>1 injection 233 (85.7%) 170 (56.5%) 403 (70.3%) 58.319  
 
Appropriateness 
     
Appropriate 204 (75.0%) 220 (73.1%) 424 (74.0%) X2: 0.271 0.603 
Inappropriate 68 (25.0%) 81 (26.9%) 149 (26.0%)   
Total number of 
prescriptions 
272 301 573   
 
Comparison of 2003 uninsured versus 2004 uninsured patients 
 Table 5 shows demographic and prescription characteristics for 2003 uninsured 
(not enrolled in CMS) and 2004 uninsured (not enrolled in RMHC) data.  A total of 142 
prescriptions were collected for uninsured patients in 2003 and 143 for uninsured patients 
in 2004.  The number of uninsured 2003 and 2004 prescriptions available for analysis 
significantly differed by village doctor: Anping and Xinhua had no records for 2003 
uninsured patient visits; Xinhua only had 3 records for 2004 uninsured patients; and 
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Yongxing had no records for 2004 uninsured patient visits (X2=78.792, p<0.001).  Age of 
uninsured patients was significantly older in 2004 than in 2003; mean age in 2004 
uninsured was 28.47 years versus 23.04 years in 2003 (t=-2.167, p=0.031); 20.3% were 
age > 46 in 2004 versus 19.0% in 2003; 48.3% were age 16-45 in 2004 versus 23.2% in 
2003; and 31.5% were age ≤ 15 in 2004 versus 57.7% in 2003 (X2=23.554, p<0.001).  As 
for gender, 2004 uninsured prescriptions were composed of 46.1% female and 53.9% 
male patients as compared to 2003 uninsured prescriptions, where 34.5% were female 
and 65.5% were male patients (X2=4.015, p=0.045).   
 Mean number of drugs significantly increased from 2003 to 2004 for uninsured 
patients, but mean costs of prescriptions significantly decreased overall.  In 2003, mean 
number of medications per patient visit was 5.32, which increased to 5.87 in 2004  
(t=-2.027, p=0.044).  However, while number of medications increased from 2003 to 
2004, mean costs decreased.  Mean costs of prescriptions for 2003 uninsured was 8.94 
yuan, which significantly decreased to 5.70 yuan in 2004 (t=2.919, p=0.004).  Use of 
injections significantly decreased from 2003, where 92.3% of all prescriptions had at 
least one injection, to 2004 with 77.6% (X2=11.905, p=0.001).  The only variable not 
statistically significantly different between the two groups was proportion of 
inappropriate prescribing, which was 29.5% overall (X2=1.002, p=0.317). 
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Table 5: Demographic and Prescription Characteristics comparing 2003 uninsured 
versus 2004 uninsured 
 2003 
uninsured 
2004 
uninsured 
Total (%) X2 or  
T-test 
P-value 
Villages      
Anping 0 (0%) 42 (29.4%) 42 (14.7%) X2:  <0.001 
Duoyang 29 (20.4%) 19 (13.3%) 48 (16.8%) 78.792  
Guaizhai 49 (34.5%) 34 (23.8%) 83 (29.1%)   
Sanhe 36 (25.3%) 45 (31.5%) 81 (28.4%)   
Xinhua 0 (0%) 3 (2.1%) 3 (1.1%)   
Yongxing 28 (19.7%) 0 (0%) 28 (9.8%)   
      
Patients      
Mean Age in 
years (95% CI) 
23.04 
(19.37, 26.71) 
28.47 
(25.15, 31.79) 
25.76 
(23.29, 28.24) 
T: -2.167 0.031 
      
      Age ≤ 15 82   (57.7%) 45   (31.5%) 127 (44.6%) X2:  <0.001 
      Age 16-45 33   (23.2%) 69   (48.3%) 102 (35.8%) 23.554  
      Age > 46 27   (19.0%) 29   (20.3%) 56   (19.7%)   
 
Gender 
     
Male 93 (65.5%) 77 (53.9%) 170 (59.7%) X2: 4.015 0.045 
Female 49 (34.5%) 66 (46.1%) 115 (40.3%)   
 
Prescriptions 
     
Mean number of 
drugs (95% CI) 
5.32 
(4.98, 5.67) 
5.87 
(5.46, 6.29) 
5.60 
(5.33, 5.87) 
T: -2.027 0.044 
      
Mean cost in yuan 
(95% CI) 
8.94 
(6.93, 10.95) 
5.70 
(4.80, 6.60) 
7.12 
(6.09, 8.14) 
T: 2.919 0.004 
      
Injections      
None 11 (7.7%) 32 (22.4%) 43 (15.1%) X2:  0.001 
>1 injection 131 (92.3%) 111 (77.6%) 242 (84.9%) 11.905  
 
Appropriateness 
     
Appropriate 104 (73.2%) 97 (67.8%) 201 (70.5%) X2: 1.002 0.317 
Inappropriate 38 (26.8%) 46 (32.2%) 84 (29.5%)   
Total number of 
prescriptions 
142 143 285   
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Multiple Linear Regression of Number of Medications 
 Table 6 shows multiple linear regression of the number of medications prescribed 
per patient visit with covariates of age, gender, village doctor, use of injections, insurance 
status, and interaction between year and insurance.  The adjusted correlation coefficient 
for this model is 0.365.  Analysis of village doctor reveals that Guaizhai, Sanhe, and 
Yongxing prescribed significantly more medicines than Anping (βDuoyang=0.189, p=0.421; 
βGuaizhai=0.691, p=0.002; βSanhe=1.099, p<0.001; βXinhua=0.476, p=0.112; βYongxing=1.688, 
p<0.001).   
Age was first analyzed as a continuous variable in this regression model, which 
revealed a highly significant association between age and number of medications after 
adjusting for other covariates (data not shown: β=0.009, p=0.004, overall model adjusted 
R2=0.357).  Subsequent age stratification, as shown in Table 6, reveals that for patients 
below age 45, more medications are prescribed as age increases (age ≤ 15 β=0.067, 
p=0.005; age 16-45 β=-0.062, p=0.048).  However, for patients above age 46, there is no 
significant correlation between age and number of medications (β=-0.016, p=0.375).  As 
for patient gender, it is not significantly associated with number of medications (β=0.265, 
p=0.058).   
Looking at other prescription characteristics in the regression reveals that number 
of medications is significantly associated with injection use, year, insurance, and year-
insurance interaction.  Use of injections is significantly positively associated with number 
of medications (β=3.461, p<0.001).  As hypothesized, there are significant associations 
between number of medications and year and insurance category.  After adjusting for 
other factors, prescriptions in 2004 had more medications per visit than prescriptions in 
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2003 (β=1.239, p<0.001).  Insured patients also had more medications per visit than 
uninsured patients, regardless of CMS or RMHC insurance type (β=1.227, p<0.001).  The 
interaction between year and insurance was also significantly negatively associated with 
number of medications (β=-1.011, p=0.001), indicating that the increase in number of 
medications for insured patients as compared to uninsured patients was less for RMHC 
than for CMS.    
 
Table 6: Multiple Linear Regression of Number of Medications 
 Adjusted β  P-value 95% CI 
Village  
(Anping as reference) 
   
Duoyang 0.189 0.421 -0.272, 0.651 
Guaizhai 0.691 0.002 0.250, 1.131 
Sanhe 1.099 <0.001 0.659, 1.539 
Xinhua 0.476 0.112 -0.111, 1.064 
Yongxing 1.688 <0.001 1.177, 2.120 
    
Age ≤ 15 0.067 0.005 0.020, 0.113 
Age 16-45 -0.062 0.048 -0.125, -0.001 
Age > 46 -0.016 0.375 -0.051, 0.019 
    
Gender 0.265 0.058 -0.009, 0.540 
    
Injection 3.461 <0.001 3.123, 3.800 
    
Year 1.239 <0.001 0.753, 1.725 
    
If insurance 1.227 <0.001 0.800, 1.653 
    
Year * insurance -1.011 0.001 -1.601, -0.422 
Adjusted R2   =   0.365    
 
Multiple Linear Regression Analyses of Costs 
 Cost was log10 transformed to more closely approximate a normal distribution.  
However, the Shapiro-Wilk test showed that neither cost nor log(cost) were normally 
distributed (cost: z=12.158, p<0.001 and logcost: z=6.803, p<0.001).  Table 7 shows 
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multiple linear regression of logcost with covariates of age, gender, village doctor, use of 
injections, year, insurance status, and year-insurance interaction.  The adjusted 
correlation coefficient for this model is 0.442.  Regarding village doctors, Guaizhai had 
significantly lower costs than Anping, while Xinhua and Yongxing had higher costs 
(βDuoyang=0.112, p=0.172; βGuaizhai=-0.177, p=0.020; βSanhe=-0.004, p=0.953; βXinhua=0.470, 
p<0.001; βYongxing=0.528, p<0.001).   
Cost was not significantly associated with age when age was analyzed as a 
continuous variable (data not shown: β=0.001, p=0.147, overall model adjusted 
R2=0.437).  As shown in Table 7, cost also was not significantly associated with any 
stratified age group (βage≤15=0.013, p=0.101; βage16-45=-0.011, p=0.312; βage>46=-0.008, 
p=0.169).  Gender was not significantly associated with logcost (β=0.023, p=0.622).   
Cost statistically significantly increased as the number of medications increased 
(β=0.158, p<0.001).  Cost, however, was not significantly associated with use of 
injections (β=0.053, p=0.452).   
 As hypothesized, cost was significantly associated with year (β=-0.272, p=0.003); 
2004 post-RMHC mean costs were 0.53 yuan lower than 2003 pre-RMHC mean costs 
after adjusting for all other factors.  As for insurance, mean costs of prescriptions were on 
average 3.01 yuan higher for insured patients than uninsured patients (β=0.478, p<0.001).  
The interaction term for year and insurance also showed statistical significance with 
logcost (β=-0.239, p=0.025), indicating that the increase in costs for insured patients as 
compared to uninsured patients is less for RMHC than for CMS.  
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Table 7: Multiple Linear Regression of Logcost 
 Adjusted β  P-value 95% CI 
Village  
(Anping as reference) 
   
Duoyang 0.112 0.172 -0.049, 0.274 
Guaizhai -0.177 0.020 -0.327, -0.028 
Sanhe -0.004 0.953 -0.154, 0.145 
Xinhua 0.470 <0.001 0.273, 0.666 
Yongxing 0.528 <0.001 0.352, 0.703 
    
Age ≤ 15 0.013 0.101 -0.003, 0.029 
Age 16-45 -0.011 0.312 -0.032, 0.010 
Age > 46 -0.008 0.169 -0.020, 0.003 
    
Gender 0.023 0.622 -0.070, 0.117 
    
Number of medications 0.158 <0.001 0.135, 0.181 
    
Injection 0.053 0.452 -0.085, 0.191 
    
Year -0.272 0.003 -0.449, -0.095 
    
If insurance 0.478 <0.001 0.318, 0.637 
    
Year * insurance -0.239 0.025 -0.447, -0.030 
Adjusted R2   =   0.442    
 
Logistic Regression Analyses of Injection Use 
 Injection use is a binary variable dependent on whether any of the medications 
written on a prescription sheet was injected as a shot or given intravenously.  Table 8 
shows logistic regression of injection use by covariates of age, gender, village doctor, 
number of medications, year, insurance status, and interaction between year and 
insurance.  Adjusted odds ratios are listed.  The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test 
was X28=9.61, p=0.294.  Regarding village doctor, Xinhua had significantly higher odds 
of injection use than Anping, while Yongxing had significantly lower odds of injection 
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(ORDuoyang=1.711, p=0.162; ORGuaizhai=0.992, p=0.981; ORSanhe=0.758, p=0.462; 
ORXinhua=3.392, p=0.007; ORYongxing=0.180, p<0.001).   
Age as a continuous variable was significantly associated with injection use (data 
not shown: OR=0.988, p=0.020, overall model X28=9.36, p=0.313).  With analysis using 
stratified age groups, older age, age > 46, was positively associated with injection use 
(OR=1.077, p=0.015), but younger ages were not significantly associated with injection 
use (ORage≤15=0.950, p=0.215; ORage16-45=1.019, p=0.732).  Gender was not associated 
with injections (OR=0.994, p=0.981).   
As expected, use of injections significantly increased as number of medications 
increased (OR=2.861, p<0.001).  Use of injections significantly decreased from 2003 to 
2004 after RMHC implementation (OR=0.139, p<0.001).  Use of injections also 
significantly decreased for insured patients as compared to uninsured patients (OR=0.239, 
p=0.001).  The interaction between year and insurance, however, is insignificant, 
indicating that RMHC insurance did not have any more impact on injection use than 
CMS insurance did (OR=1.290, p=0.641). 
 
Table 8: Logistic Regression of Use of Injections 
 Adjusted OR  P-value 95% CI 
Village  
(Anping as reference) 
   
Duoyang 1.711 0.162 0.806, 3.632 
Guaizhai 0.992 0.981 0.493, 1.995 
Sanhe 0.758 0.462 0.363, 1.583 
Xinhua 3.932 0.007 1.458, 10.603 
Yongxing 0.180 <0.001 0.077, 0.423 
    
Age ≤ 15 0.950 0.215 0.877, 1.030 
Age 16-45 1.019 0.732 0.914, 1.136 
Age > 46 1.077 0.015 1.015, 1.144 
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Table 8: Logistic Regression of Use of Injections (cont) 
 Adjusted OR  P-value 95% CI 
Gender 0.994 0.981 0.617, 1.601 
    
Number of medications 2.861 <0.001 2.415, 3.390 
    
Year 0.139 <0.001 0.055, 0.349 
    
If insurance 0.239 0.001 0.101, 0.570 
    
Year * insurance 1.290 0.641 0.442, 3.769 
Hosmer-Lemeshow X2(df 8)  =   9.61,   p  =  0.294 
 
Logistic Regression Analyses of Inappropriate Prescriptions 
  Inappropriate prescribing is a binary variable representing the presence of any 
inappropriately prescribed medications on a prescription sheet.  Table 9 shows logistic 
regression of inappropriate prescribing as a function of age, gender, village doctor, 
injection use, number of medications, year, insurance status, and interaction between year 
and insurance.  Adjusted odds ratios are listed.  The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit 
test was X28=4.02, p=0.855.  Analysis of village doctor reveals that Duoyang and Sanhe 
had significantly higher odds of inappropriate prescriptions than Anping 
(ORDuoyang=2.593, p=0.001; ORGuaizhai=1.039, p=0.897; ORSanhe=2.077, p=0.009; 
ORXinhua=0.890, p=0.772; ORYongxing=1.311, p=0.430).   
Age as a continuous variable was not significantly associated with inappropriate 
prescribing (data not shown: OR=0.995, p=0.233, overall model X28=5.52, p=0.701).  By 
contrast, analysis with stratified age groups show that age ≤ 15 and age 16-45 are both 
significantly associated with inappropriate prescribing, but age > 46 is not 
(ORage>46=0.981, p=0.376).  For age ≤ 15, as age increased, the proportion of 
inappropriate prescriptions actually decreased (ORage≤15=0.937, p=0.023), which was the 
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opposite for age 16-45 (ORage16-45=1.082, p=0.041).  Gender was also significantly 
associated with inappropriate prescribing; inappropriate prescribing was lower for female 
patients (OR=0.657, p=0.013).   
Injection use was not associated with inappropriate prescribing (OR=0.917, 
p=0.743).  As expected, inappropriate prescribing was significantly and positively 
associated with number of medications (OR=1.253, p=<0.001).  Contrary to hypothesis, 
however, year, insurance status, and the interaction between the two were all not 
significantly associated with inappropriate prescribing (ORYear=1.328, p=0.331;  
ORIf insurance=0.869, p=0.589; ORYear*insurance=0.962, p=0.912).   
 
Table 9: Logistic Regression of Inappropriate Prescribing 
 Adjusted OR  P-value 95% CI 
Village  
(Anping as reference) 
   
Duoyang 2.593 0.001 1.481, 4.539 
Guaizhai 1.039 0.897 0.582, 1.854 
Sanhe 2.077 0.009 1.120, 3.598 
Xinhua 0.890 0.772 0.406, 1.953 
Yongxing 1.311 0.430 0.669, 2.569 
    
Age ≤ 15 0.937 0.023 0.886, 0.991 
Age 16-45 1.082 0.041 1.003, 1.167 
Age > 46 0.981 0.376 0.940, 1.023 
    
Gender 0.657 0.013 0.473, 0.915 
    
Number of medications 1.253 <0.001 1.154, 1.361 
    
Injection 0.917 0.743 0.545, 1.542 
    
Year 1.328 0.331 0.750, 2.351 
    
If insurance 0.869 0.589 0.523, 1.445 
    
Year * insurance 0.962 0.912 0.481, 1.924 
Hosmer-Lemeshow X2(df 8)  =   4.02,   p  =  0.855 
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DISCUSSION   
Study Findings 
 This pilot study’s purpose was to evaluate RMHC’s impact on physician 
prescribing behavior.  In this study, we analyzed 858 prescriptions from 6 village doctors, 
with diagnoses limited to only “common cold”.  Results show that RMHC significantly 
lowered number of medications prescribed per visit and lowered prescription costs, but 
RMHC did not change inappropriate prescribing or injection use.   
Analysis of baseline demographic and patient characteristics revealed that patient 
age, use of injections, and prescription costs were all significantly different between 2003 
and 2004 (Table 2), between insured and uninsured patients (Table 3), between RMHC 
and CMS enrolled patients (Table 4), and between uninsured patients during 2003 and 
2004 (Table 5).  The difference in age between groups is likely due to adverse selection 
in enrollment, with more older patients enrolling in RMHC.35  The differences in 
injection use and costs may be caused by stricter drug controls and standards created by 
RMHC.  Proportion of inappropriate prescriptions, however, did not significantly differ 
between years and insurance categories. 
 Average costs after RMHC implementation, 7.22 yuan (US $0.90), were nearly 
half of costs before RMHC implementation, 13.09 yuan (US $1.64).  Under both 
insurance systems, insured patients spent more on prescriptions than uninsured patients.  
This likely reflects adverse selection seen in previous RMHC studies, where older and 
sicker patients are more likely to enroll in RMHC.35  Also, insured patients are more 
likely to use and overuse health services because of increased affordability.  In addition, 
doctors may prescribe more medications for insured patients to keep patients satisfied and 
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returning because doctors are partly reimbursed fee-for-visit by RMHC.  One study of 
Hong Kong doctors in 2003 found that many doctors, when asked about their own 
behavior, thought they overused antibiotics: common reasons for overusing antibiotics 
were patient satisfaction, fear of malpractice suits, and saving time.36  In particular, older 
doctors, private practice doctors, and more senior doctors were more likely to report 
this.36  Perhaps insured patients have more purchasing power and thus more influence on 
doctors to prescribe newer, more expensive, or better medications. 
As hypothesized, the regression model for cost showed a significant interaction 
between year and insurance, a negative value, indicating that the cost difference between 
insured and uninsured patients was less for RMHC.  In addition, the regression model for 
number of medications also showed a significant negative association between number of 
medication and the year-insurance interaction term.  Thus, RMHC seems better than 
CMS in regulating overall costs and number of medications for insured patients as 
compared to uninsured patients even with adverse selection.  This finding agrees with this 
study’s original hypothesis.  These differences in mean costs are statistically associated 
with number of medications and prescribing doctor.  The strong relationship between 
prescription costs and number of medications is expected, as is the fact that certain 
doctors tend to have higher costs: Xinhua village and Yongxing village in particular.  
After adjusting for all other factors, costs were still significantly associated with year and 
with insurance status. 
 Contrary to original hypotheses, this study found no significant difference in the 
proportion of inappropriate prescriptions by year or by insurance status.  Even after 
controlling for all other factors, there was no significant difference between effects of 
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RMHC versus CMS insurance on inappropriate prescribing (Table 9: 
ORYear*insurance=0.962, p=0.912).  As expected, increased number of medications is 
strongly associated with increased odds of inappropriate prescriptions, roughly 1.25 times 
higher odds per additional drug.   
Logistic regression results show that number of medications, prescribing doctor, 
patient age, and patient gender are all significantly associated with inappropriate 
prescribing.  In Table 9, the adjusted OR for gender was 0.657 (p=0.013), indicating that 
female patients had lower odds of inappropriate prescriptions, which is quite interesting.  
One possible explanation is that all village doctors were male and perhaps preferentially 
over-prescribed for male patients.  Alternatively, perhaps this study’s data sample was 
too small and skewed.  As for age, analysis with age as a continuous variable showed no 
association with inappropriate prescriptions.  However, analysis with stratified age 
groups revealed a significant negative association between inappropriate prescribing and 
age ≤ 15; a significant positive association between inappropriate prescribing and age 16-
45; but no significant association with inappropriate prescribing and age > 46.  This could 
once again be due to small sample size.  Another possible explanation is that physicians 
may be more cautious and careful in prescribing for pediatric patients whereas 
prescribing for adult patients may be more influenced by patient finances or preference.   
 The fact that this study shows RMHC was successful in reducing number of 
medications but not in reducing inappropriate prescribing is inconsistent.  One would 
assume that reducing the number of medications per visit would lower overprescribing of 
unnecessary and/or redundant medications.  This calls into question the accuracy of the 
methods used to determine inappropriate prescribing.  Insufficient sample size and study 
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design may be limiting factors to see the true association between RMHC and 
inappropriate prescribing.  One major limitation to this study is that peer reviewers were 
not blinded to village doctor.  Prescriptions were also only judged by one peer reviewer, 
and inter-observer scoring was not checked.  A defined set of criteria for “inappropriate” 
prescriptions was used by the 2 peer reviewers.  The list of criteria should have been 
straightforward and logical (incorrect use, dose, drug delivery method, drug interactions, 
redundancy), but interpretation of the criteria was likely variable.  Perhaps the peer 
reviewers were unable to correctly judge the village doctors’ prescribing quality due to 
similar levels of medical training.  A more likely answer, however, is that the peer 
reviewers had limited information about the clinical picture to correctly judge medication 
appropriateness.  For instance, insured RMHC records were required to have both 
diagnoses and presenting symptoms, but uninsured records often only had diagnoses 
listed.  Village doctors may also have documented a higher severity of symptoms in order 
to get fully reimbursed by RMHC.  Furthermore, proper, systematic sampling of 
prescriptions was quite difficult given inadequate record-keeping of certain village 
doctors.   
Fundamentally, a binary variable of inappropriate versus appropriate is a very 
crude way of simplifying a complex process of diagnosis and treatment.  Vitamin shots, 
for example, could be judged as unnecessary but not inappropriate by one physician or 
judged as unnecessary plus inappropriate by another physician.  Using traditional Chinese 
medicine and Western medicine for the same symptoms could also be seen as redundant 
or complimentary.  Other studies have found that physicians who provide more expensive 
therapy out of financial incentives are not necessarily providing inappropriate 
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treatment.37  Thus, the “inappropriate prescribing” variable encompasses a large gray area 
of decision-making that cannot be easily reduced to a binary variable.   
On the other hand, another possible explanation is that RMHC actually does not 
affect physician prescribing behavior.  RMHC is structured around financial protection 
for patients and not necessarily quality control.  Thus, RMHC has an essential drug list to 
decrease use of counterfeit, expired, and inappropriate drugs.  However, few utilization 
management measures are in place to change physician prescribing behavior.  Perhaps 
the decreased number of overall medications prescribed under RMHC represents a 
decrease in appropriate as well as inappropriate medications.  Furthermore, RMHC does 
not focus on changing patient demand for medications, which can be a strong factor in 
inappropriate prescribing of antibiotics and injections.   
 
Study Strengths 
 The strengths of this pilot study are its focus on the impact of rural health 
insurance on physician prescribing behavior and its findings regarding prescription costs 
for common colds.  Previous studies on RMHC have focused on insurance-specific topics 
such as adverse selection,35 but none have examined the impact of RMHC on physician  
prescribing behavior.  This study showed the importance and feasibility of measuring 
quantitative and qualitative changes in physician prescribing behavior under RMHC.  
Results from this pilot study show that RMHC had dramatic effects on lowering the 
number of medications prescribed per visit and decreasing prescription drug costs for 
rural residents in Guizhou, the poorest province in China.  Prescription drugs constitute 
the largest portion of out-of-pocket medical expenses.  Lowered drug costs should thus 
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greatly increase access to and affordability of health care.  Although this study found no 
change in inappropriate prescribing with RMHC, it demonstrates that evaluating 
physician prescribing behavior is quite important.  Not only does physician prescribing 
behavior greatly influence the quality of patient care, but behavior also widely varies 
depending on individual village doctor. 
 
Study Limitations 
 In addition to those mentioned above, study limitations include poor data quality, 
peer reviewer bias, and study design.  Sample sizes were quite variable depending on 
individual doctor and insurance category.  Record-keeping for uninsured patients was 
also quite poor: total number of prescriptions for uninsured patients was half that for 
insured patients, and some village doctors had no prescriptions for the uninsured.  In 
addition, among the uninsured prescriptions, 31 were missing costs and 62 were missing 
symptoms (likely used by peer reviewers to evaluate inappropriate prescribing).  Copies 
of these prescriptions were obtained directly from village doctors, who could have lost or 
withheld prescriptions for this study.  Small sample size and poor data quality might also 
explain the lack of normal distribution for age and logcost.  Percentages of inappropriate 
prescribing per village doctor are strikingly different for this pilot study as compared to 
the prior January-February 2004 RMHC evaluation.  This difference could be due to 
small sample sizes in this pilot study, flawed study design, and peer reviewer bias. 
 Peer reviewer bias may strongly affect study results.  There were two physicians 
reviewing all prescriptions for inappropriateness.  Both worked at the local health 
department in charge of the RMHC insurance program.  Because these peer reviewers 
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oversaw and evaluated village doctors on a regular basis, they could have had strong 
personal biases regarding specific doctors.  Peer reviewers were also not blinded to study 
aims or patient insurance status. 
In the future, study design should be optimized.  First, a larger study should be 
done evaluating more than just 6 village doctors.  The prior RMHC evaluation in 
January-February 2004 reviewed 21 village health posts and 31 village doctors.  Second, 
physicians behave independently from each other, but all patients treated by the same 
physician likely receive similar care.  Given this, cluster analysis is the most appropriate 
approach for evaluating village doctors.  This study had only 6 clusters, which made 
cluster analysis a poor choice for this study.  Furthermore, cluster analysis should also 
take into account multiple visits by the same patient.  Insured patients and sick patients 
who can afford care may visit doctors multiple times in a month, and these visits likely 
result in similar prescriptions.  Moreover, providers may encourage multiple visits to 
increase RMHC reimbursements for fee-for-service.  Thus, future studies should cluster 
by individual doctors and individual patients.  Lack of cluster analysis in this study 
probably leads to underestimating the differences between village doctors and 
overestimating the impact of RMHC on physician prescribing practices.   
Lastly, this study attempted to evaluate the RMHC insurance program in 2004 by 
comparing it to the old CMS insurance program in 2003.  This method was akin to using 
a retrospective control for RMHC insurance.  A better way to evaluate RMHC would be 
to compare and match villages currently with RMHC to villages currently without 
RMHC to control for time, season, local disease patterns, and patient demographics. 
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Future Studies 
Analysis of cost and quality of care is essential to evaluating the overall success 
of RMHC.  Cost is a quantitative and easily obtained measure.  Quality, however, as seen 
in this study, is quite difficult to measure accurately.  This pilot study found encouraging 
results regarding RMHC’s ability to lower prescription drug costs for poor rural residents 
in China.  Future studies should explore the distribution of benefits and see if financial 
protection favors the poor or the rich.  Other diagnoses in addition to “common cold” 
should be studied to see if costs and prescription error rates differ by disease.  Analyses 
with larger sample sizes, more clusters of village doctors and individual patient clusters 
would be useful.  Future studies could also study several other quality of care variables 
such as antibiotic usage or appropriate tuberculosis treatment.  Other considerations are 
specific village doctor characteristics such as doctor age, years of training, years of 
practice, satisfaction with reimbursement policies, and overall satisfaction with RMHC.  
These could be significant confounders in any cost or quality analysis.   
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CONCLUSION 
RMHC is an experimental health insurance program in rural China that focuses on 
primary care.  Its unique focus on outpatient and preventive services makes RMHC an 
appealing alternative to other NCMS programs focused solely on catastrophic inpatient 
coverage.  If RMHC succeeds, it will become an important example for NCMS 
development in rural China.  Determinants of success include sustainability, financial 
protection for patients, improved access to health care, and, ultimately, improved health 
outcomes.  This pilot study shows that RMHC does indeed lower drug costs for patients 
and thus increases financial protection for poor, rural residents.  RMHC’s cost-control 
success in even the poorest province of China, Guizhou, bodes well for RMHC feasibility 
and success in other, less poor rural areas.  Access and quality of care, however, need to 
be studied in greater detail.  Rural Mutual Health Care seems to be a viable option for the 
rest of rural China, provided that its short-term success in controlling costs can be 
sustained and its quality control measures can be expanded. 
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